Skies talks and the confidence-and securitybuilding measures (CSBM) negotiations. The improvements wrought by the nearly completed START agreement will be less radical, though still substantial. In overall strategic force levels, the START cutbacks will be closer 152.
to 10-20 per cent than the advertised cent as a result of a variety of exclusio clever "counting rules." But a completed ag ment will bring real 50 per cent cuts in missile warheads, the most worrisome p the Soviet arsenal. And START will im wide-ranging regime of declarations an spections on each side's strategic forces fo first time, providing an excellent ba deeper reductions.
The coming revolution in the military will challenge even the most basic tene NATO planning. With no Pact attack p without months of warning, NATO transform its readiness and reinforcemen cies, shifting emphasis from active for reserves. No longer facing Pact numeri periority, NATO could relax its insisten qualitative superiority and could slow w modernization. NATO's nuclear first-use doctrine should be abandoned and its nuclear arsenal slashed; its "forward defense" strategy ought to be replaced by a less offensively oriented defense-in-depth. With less need to compensate for inferiority on land, some reductions can be made in forces at sea. With less need to "extend" nuclear deterrence to Europe and less fear of a Soviet surprise attack, U.S. strategic forces could be reduced further, and their modernization curtailed.
Long-time defense official and analyst William Kaufmann has argued that as a result of follow-on arms accords the U.S. defense budget could be nearly halved by the year 2000, assuming sweeping follow-on arms agreements; the savings over 10 years might be well over half a trillion dollars. Although the Bush administration has tried to limit the potential reductions to only 2 per cent a year, there is no longer any rationale for a military budget of more than $300 billion annually. The public yearning for a "peace dividend" will create strong pressure for reductions in military spending and continued arms negotiations. This is the political context for the next steps in arms control.
Given the pace of new unilateral cutback announcements, some argue that the tedious process of arms talks will only get in the way.
Unquestionably, unilateral cutbacks in con- Fourth, negotiated agreements can channel reductions in directions that are most conducive to overall stability. Purely unilateral cuts are likely to be driven more by economics than by concern for the security of one's neighbors, and the most threatening weapons are not always the most expensive. Despite recent budget cuts, for example, the Pentagon is proceeding full steam ahead with a bevy of new antisatellite (ASAT) weapons, potentially restarting a dangerous space-weapon competition. Negotiation can direct the budget ax toward the forces perceived as most threatening.
Finally, building a new security system for Europe will not only require cutbacks in forces but also international organizations to manage, inspect, and report. These will only be gained through negotiation, by the sweat of diplomats' brows.
Europe will be a fertile field for arms control even after all the reductions announced or under negotiation are complete, because substantial security issues and military burdensboth economic and political-will remain. As the blocs fade in importance, the arms control process inevitably will have to become a more pan-European discussion. European arms agreements after CFE will have at least as much to do with limiting the Soviet threat to its East European allies, reassuring Germany's neighbors, and reducing the risk of conflict in the 155.
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Balkans or the Aegean as they will with adjusting the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. For managing these complex and politically charged questions, permanent, pan-European organizations and negotiating forums such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will be essential and will have to be further developed.
There are three main military dangers to be avoided: deliberate attack, whether by surprise or after a period of hostility and troop mobilization; inadvertent war, arising from the escalation of political confrontation into a series of ever-more-threatening alerts, mobilizations, and provocations; and armed political intimidation through menacing concentrations of forces at an adversary's borders.
A CFE II accord could help on all these counts, through a combination of limits that might be dubbed the three R's: reductions, particularly in the military hardware most Reductions. CFE II should cut much deeper, providing the substantial peace dividend that Europeans are demanding, and coming closer to fulfilling CFE's mandate to eliminate all capabilities "for . . . initiating large-scale offensive action." These follow-on reductions should focus less on the alliance-wide ceilings that are the centerpiece of CFE and more on nation-bynation restraints. As John Steinbruner of the Brookings Institution has recently suggested, the force each nation is permitted might be roughly proportional to the miles of border it has to defend.
The goal of these cuts should be to create a more defense-dominant military balance, reducing offensive forces to the point that each nation's defenses are adequate to protect against any invader. To that end, CFE II should continue CFE's practice of focusing on the key 156. weapons of a modern blitzkrieg-aircraft, a lery, helicopters, and tanks and other arm vehicles-while leaving more strictly def equipment such as air defense missiles, tank weapons, and barriers unrestrained first step, each nation's post-CFE holdin aircraft, armored troop carriers, artillery helicopters could be reduced by an aver 50 per cent-a figure similar to that pro by former NATO Supreme Commander drew Goodpaster, among others-while t which remain the single most essential com nent of any large-scale invasion on the pean battlefield, could be cut back even ther. A limit of 1,500 tanks for the la nations in Europe, for example, would f bring those tank armies (including Germ No agreement could make such mobilizations and concentrations of forces physically impossible, but an agreed ban on large-scale "out-of-garrison activities" would raise the political threshold at which they might be undertaken. This would make intimidation more difficult and military escalation of a political confrontation less likely. CFE II might prohibit all mobilizations and war games involving more than 25,000 troops, a level too small for a substantial attack against a major power. 
Nukes and Navies
The thousands of nuclear weapons still burdening Europe must also be dealt with. While NATO has resisted changing its excessive nuclear reliance, the rationale for tactical nuclear modernization or even the maintenance of much of NATO's existing nuclear arsenal has been swept away by the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact threat. Moreover, the pending reunification of Germany dooms the political future of NATO nuclear weapons deployed there, particularly as nuclear artillery and short-range missiles could only reach the eastern half of Germany and the newly democratizing countries of Eastern Europe. Arms controllers in Washington are asking: "Do we still have a job?"
The limited START reductions should provide the base for a much more sweeping START II agreement. There is simply no plausible reason why the United States needs the more than 10,000 strategic warheads it will have after START. This is more than twice the number it had in 1968, before strategic arms talks began, when Czechoslovakia had just been invaded and war with Soviet-supplied forces raged in Vietnam.
Complete nuclear disarmament is not likely to be on the agenda in the foreseeable future. Indeed, it is unlikely that either superpower would agree to reduce its strategic arsenal 160. below the combined total of those of Brita China, and France, setting a likely near-t minimum still measured in thousands of warheads. Deeper reductions will likely depend on the other nuclear powers joining the process. Unfortunately, cuts to such levels would only marginally reduce the horrifying devastation that could result from a nuclear war.
Soviet negotiators have been raising START II ideas since 1989, and the Bush administration responded in March 1990 with a proposal to phase out multiple-warhead land-based missiles-those carrying so-called multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).
(In theory, such land-based hydras create destabilizing incentives to strike first, as each accurate MIRV could potentially destroy several of its counterparts on the other side.) But the Bush administration has so far resisted placing this deMIRVing proposal in a broader context of post-START reductions and technological restraints, raising Soviet concerns over its asymmetrical impact. The USSR has nearly 6,000 warheads on its multiple-warhead land-based missiles, while the United States has about 2,000. This U.S. reluctance is ill-founded, for there are sound strategic, political, and economic reasons to pursue a START II agreement mandating deep cuts, coupled with restraints on the most threatening new weapons.
The current strategic balance is basically stable, with each side's enormous arsenal providing a fearsome deterrent to attack, even in a moment of desperate crisis. Some national security officials are therefore arguing "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." The fear is that deep cuts could actually make the nuclear balance more precarious: With the fat removed from the arsenals, a first-strike attack on the remainder might cut into the muscle and could seem a more plausible option in an extreme confrontation.
But properly managed reductions can avoid these pitfalls and provide the best available path toward the Bush administration's goal of a more stable deMIRVed world. START will probably leave each side with some 1,500-3,000 warheads on land-based missiles, many of them MIRVed. It would be absurdly expensive to build anything like that number of sin-161. Deep reductions in strategic arsenals would require a fundamental reassessment of current nuclear strategy. But that task is a blessing in disguise: Current U.S. strategic war plans are heavily focused on hairtrigger strategies of launching either as soon as reliable warning of attack is received, or just after the first nuclear weapons detonate, leaving dangerously little time for careful deliberation. While deep reductions are neither strictly necessary nor sufficient to change those plans, they would surely help in two ways.
First, reductions structured for stability 162. would make the current emphasis on dest ing the other side's land-based missiles in th silos impossible to maintain. Eliminating most important of the "time urgent" tar could contribute to an across-the-board reassessment of the need to respond to attack in minutes rather than hours. Second, deep cuts would inevitably shorten the lengthy menu of destruction contained in current war plans, undermining the dogma that deterrence requires incredibly complex schemes of retaliation. It is far past time to recognize that thermonuclear bombs are not simply more powerful conventional weapons but instruments of political fear. Deterrence does not require destroying every obscure oblast party headquarters in the Soviet Union.
If not 10,000, how many weapons are necessary for deterrence? The Brookings-Livermore study found that 1,500-2,000 targets represent a "plausible upper bound" on the degree of retaliation required "under even the most demanding concept of deterrence"-one that accepts the view that deterrence requires the ability to threaten a broad range of military and economic targets. Since not all weapons would be available at any given time, and some might be destroyed in a preemptive attack, ensuring an ability to destroy the bulk of those 1,500-2,000 targets might require an arsenal of some 3,000 weapons. Even a few hundred weapons would be enough to virtually obliterate the Soviet Union as a functioning society. But, as already suggested, it is likely to be politically difficult to reach agreement in the near term on a reduction to such a "minimum deterrent."
Limiting Defenses
The dismantling of all land-based multiplewarhead missiles can best be accomplished as part of a START II reduction to some 3,000 strategic warheads, distributed among land-, sea-, and air-based forces. In addition, START In the longer term, the treaty should be strengthened through a new "zero ABM" accord, abolishing the single ABM site now permitted-it is too small to be of any real use anyway-and the ABM testing associated with it. That would force the Soviets to dismantle their Moscow ABM system, significantly lengthening the time it would take to build an ABM system capable of interfering with the greatly reduced U.S. deterrent forces remaining after START II. Although the United States does not have a similar system to dismantle, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov has publicly suggested that the USSR might accept such a treaty-strengthening accord.
Such a ban on systems to shoot down missiles should be coupled with a ban on weapons to shoot down satellites-a new double zero in space. The Soviet Union announced a unilateral moratorium on ASAT testing in 1983, which remains in effect, and has proposed an accord banning all ASAT testing and has offered to dismantle its existing system. The United States should seize that offer (with some haggling over details), because U.S. military forces are critically dependent on secure spacecraft for everything from early warning of attack to communications, and the develop- move one of the most glaringly discriminatory aspects of the existing nonproliferation regime.
Policing Nuclear Arsenals
Arms control can also play a critical role in the regional conflicts of the developing world.
Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons will remain the most obvious and essential task.
The existing nuclear nonproliferation regime, while imperfect, has succeeded in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities and in convincing the more recent members of the nuclear club (India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa) to keep their bombs in the basement rather than undertake large-scale public deployments. Increasing U.S.-Soviet cooperation could help implement many of the ideas that have been proposed to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. the Soviet Union pledged to adhere to MT guidelines, but the assurances so far receiv from China are less substantial. While these efforts have had some success, a broader approach is needed, including more participants, more binding provisions, and a full-time organization to monitor export controls.
At the same time, it must be recognized that most of the casualties in the regional wars of the future are likely to be inflicted by more traditional weaponry, much of which will be supplied by the major industrialized powers.
Unfortunately, as defense industries in the industrialized world are threatened by declining East-West tension, there will be strong economic incentives for military exports. Where weapons are bought on credit or provided as aid-as in Soviet military supplies to Central America and Syria, which have already been cut back--economic forces will discourage exports; but wherever cold cash is available, the temptations to sell will be strong. Finally, many of the arms control concepts developed in East-West negotiations could potentially be applied in other areas-an idea that is taking root across the globe. While the U.S.-Soviet experience suggests that progress will be slow when relations between the prospective parties are particularly sour, it also suggests that successful arms talks can help warm relations and build trust beyond the accord's direct military impact. In such regional negotiations, the superpowers may be able to provide technical assistance and advice much as they do now in military and economic matters.
By the end of this year, START and CFE agreements are likely to have been completed, and the arms control process will have decisively demonstrated its worth. But neither of these pacts can claim to take full advantage of the new opportunities that now beckon. The time has come to reflect the fading of political confrontation in the mirror of military dismantlement, improving security while diverting substantial savings to more urgent economic and ecological needs. For who knows how long that door will be open? It would be the greatest tragedy since the Cold War began if the two sides were to miss this chance or to stop at the first steps now being negotiated only to see the door slam shut. The critical tasks are to maintain the momentum, to nail down START and CFE, and to insist that negotiations toward sweeping next steps not be delayed. History will not forgive those who fail to act in time.
